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PROMOTING PROGRESS WITH FAIR USE
JOSHUA N. MITCHELL†
ABSTRACT
The Intellectual Property (IP) Clause provides that Congress has
the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” In the realm of
copyright, Congress and the courts have interpreted the clause as
granting Congress a power not to promote progress but to establish
limited IP monopolies. To return to an understanding of the IP power
better grounded in the constitutional text, Congress and the courts
should ensure that any IP enactment “promote[s] . . . Progress” by
considering whether it improves the quality or quantity of knowledge
and aids the dissemination of knowledge, and whether it does so
better than prior IP enactments. The courts can exercise the fair-use
doctrine to aid in this re-constitutionalization of IP law by applying a
fifth fair-use factor. This proposed fifth factor would balance the
progress-promoting value of the alleged infringer’s use against the
progress-promoting value of enforcing the copyright holder’s rights.
Reviewing courts should presume that any alleged infringement is fair
if it promotes progress better than the enforcement of the copyright.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) law in the United States is off course
and headed onto the shoals of ever-increasing protectionism.
Copyright law, in particular, has been commandeered by a process of
industry-sponsored expansion in which Congress and the courts
reviewing its legislation have acquiesced. The last forty years have
seen the copyright term increase, from a modest twenty-eight years,
1
to the life of the author plus seventy years. Increases in statutory
damages for copyright infringement, which can be assessed without
proving actual damages, have left peer-to-peer file sharers potentially
2
liable for multimillion-dollar judgments. A Congress that can agree
on little else sheathes its daggers and finds bipartisan agreement over
the prospect of toughening peripheral restrictions on the online use of
copyrighted material—granting the government unprecedented
3
censorship powers over the worldwide web along the way.
In sum, copyright law has come uncoupled from its
constitutionally defined purpose. A tightly circumscribed right
intended to incentivize creativity and the spread of knowledge has
instead become an ever-expanding monopoly over creative works and
the means by which those works are disseminated. Industries that rely
4
on IP control increasingly resort to legislation and litigation instead
of innovation in their efforts to protect existing revenue streams and
5
to maintain long-term control over new creations. And these

1. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (“The copyright secured by this title shall endure for
twenty-eight years from the date of first publication . . . .”), with 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)
(“Copyright . . . subsists from [a work’s] creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life
of the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”).
2. E.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048–49 (D. Minn.
2010) (considering a total jury verdict of approximately $2 million—$80,000 per infringed sound
recording—which the court labeled “monstrous and shocking”); cf. Prioritizing Resources and
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 104, 122 Stat. 4256,
4259 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (Supp. II 2008)) (increasing civil and criminal
penalties for trademark infringement).
3. “[T]he Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously approved [the Combating Online
Infringement and Counterfeits Act, which] . . . . is among the most draconian laws ever
considered to combat digital piracy.” Sam Gustin, Web Censorship Bill Sails Through Senate
Committee, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/11/coicaweb-censorship-bill.
4. Copyright industries are largely centered around entertainment—movie, music,
television, and software. Patent industries include technology producers of every stripe.
5. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 24 (2009)
(“Litigation has become the tool by which the copyright industries deceive themselves into
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copyright industries have, in the latter part of the twentieth century
and the first decade of the twenty-first, found willing allies in the
6
7
courts and in Congress, over whose eyes the copyright industries
have become adept at pulling wool.
8
This Note offers a new weapon to combat these overreaching
(IP) enactments in Congress and their acceptance in the courts.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8—the IP Clause of the U.S.
Constitution—grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
9
Discoveries.” Both Congress and the courts have begun to follow a
faulty but increasingly common interpretation of the grant of power
to Congress in that clause. Congress and the courts have lost sight of
the requirement that IP enactments “promote the Progress of Science
10
and useful Arts.” Although Congress appears unlikely to address
11
this problem, the courts could take a step toward doing so by adding

thinking they can avoid the inevitable stagnation that occurs when they fail to focus on the
essential purpose of their business as a ‘customer-creating and customer-satisfying organism.’”).
6. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (calling the extra twenty years granted
by the Copyright Term Extension Act a “rational” and therefore constitutional exercise of
congressional power); PATRY, supra note 5, at 62–63 (“A brief presented to the Supreme Court
in the Eldred case by 12 economists . . . demonstrated that the extra 20 years [granted by the
Copyright Term Extension Act] was simply a windfall to copyright owners, a redistribution of
money from consumers to copyright owners, and will result in far fewer derivative works being
created as the cost of clearing rights to use works that would otherwise be in the public domain
is prohibitive.”).
7. PATRY, supra note 5, at 161 (“In 1998, the [Motion Picture Association of America]
and the [Recording Industry Association of America] successfully lobbied Congress for
powerful new rights in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)[, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)] . . . .”).
8. Other commentators have urged limitations to IP enactments based, for example, on
the First Amendment. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 305 (2009)
(urging “that the First Amendment be read absolutely, in keeping with its first and most obvious
meaning: that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press by
conferring monopolies in expression that otherwise would belong to the universe of discourses in
which all are free to share and share alike” (emphasis in original)).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress derives its power to enact copyright and patent
statutes from this clause.
10. Id.
11. When it considers IP at all, Congress generally attempts to expand it. See, e.g.,
Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2010) (expanding
protection of copyrighted works by, for example, authorizing the Attorney General to
“commence an in rem action against” a website if copyright infringement is “central to the
activity” of the website).
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a fifth factor to the familiar and flexible fair-use test —a factor that
specifically asks whether the use of a copyrighted work “promote[s]
13
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” better than the protection
of the original author’s rights.
Part I discusses the courts’ and Congress’s modern tendency to
incorrectly read the IP Clause as a grant of monopoly-awarding
power. Part II argues for a reading of the IP Clause that would
necessarily limit Congress’s power to enact IP laws by construing
“promot[ion]” to require an improvement over the current state of
legislation, and “Progress” to require both qualitative advancement
of knowledge and encouragement to the dissemination of copyrighted
works. Part III suggests a potential ameliorative step to the problems
described in the previous Parts: the judicial application of a fifth fairuse factor explicitly comparing the progress-promoting value of the
allegedly infringing work with that of the underlying work. This
proposal, if put into effect, would have a destabilizing effect on
copyright holders’ rights, but it would move copyright policy back
toward its constitutional foundation.
I. INTERPRETING THE IP CLAUSE
The IP Clause grants Congress the power to make laws providing
exclusive rights to authors and inventors. This power conflicts with
the restrictions placed on Congress by the First Amendment.
Consistency with these restrictions requires a narrow, circumscribed
reading of the IP Clause. Fortunately, the text of the clause already
provides appropriate limitations—if only Congress and the courts
could be convinced to take them seriously.
A. The Plain Meaning of the IP Clause
14

Copyright in the United States is a “creature of statute.” At its
root, then, it is a creature of the Constitution, for it is an axiom of
constitutional law that Congress may only legislate pursuant to one of

12. The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement on the copyright. Courts
determine whether a use is fair by applying a nonexclusive list of four factors. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2006). For further discussion of the fair-use test, see infra notes 124–33 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2005).
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15

its constitutionally enumerated powers. Those affirmative legislative
powers reside in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, a section that
comprises a single sentence with a series of grammatically parallel
16
infinitive phrases, each granting Congress a specific power or cluster
17
of powers.
Unlike the other clauses in Section 8—which consist of simple
18
grants (“[t]o provide and maintain a Navy” ), complex grants (“[t]o
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
19
concerning Captures on Land and Water” ), or grants with express
limitations (“[t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of
20
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years” )—the
IP Clause’s structure is mildly ambiguous. This has resulted in
legislative and judicial hand-wringing over what, exactly, the IP
Clause empowers Congress to do.
The IP Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
21
Writings and Discoveries.” The best reading of this clause interprets
the phrase “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” as
the clause’s grant of power, with the remainder of the clause serving
as an internally limited means by which Congress may exercise that
grant. Other readings of the clause—those that, for example, treat the
22
grant of power as mere preamble —fail to protect important free

15. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323 (1819) (“Congress, by the
constitution, is invested with certain powers; and, as to the objects, and within the scope of these
powers, it is sovereign.” (emphasis added)).
16. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 44 IDEA 331, 346 (2004). Although the grants in Article I, Section 8 are—strictly
speaking—phrases rather than clauses, the legal convention is to refer to them as “clauses.” This
Note will follow that convention.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 346 (“Article I, Section 8
enumerates the powers granted to Congress in eighteen separate clauses of which the Science
and Useful Arts Clause is the eighth. These clauses exhibit a remarkably uniform and parallel
grammatical structure. They consist of a series of infinitive verb forms, declaring the specific
powers given to Congress. In each instance, the infinitive verb form is the legally operative grant
of power.” (footnotes omitted)).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
19. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
20. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
21. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22. E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211–12 (2003).
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speech interests, including the development of a healthy and growing
23
public domain.
The IP Clause’s structure comprises two elements: the progress24
promoting clause (“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
25
26
Arts” ) and the monopoly-granting clause (“by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
27
respective Writings and Discoveries” ). The most natural, plainlanguage reading of the IP Clause is that the progress-promoting
clause, like each of the other seventeen infinitive clauses in Article I,
Section 8, grants power: “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
28
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” In the words of
23. Recognition of the public domain as an affirmative entity, worthy of protection in its
own right, largely began with David Lange’s seminal 1981 essay, Recognizing the Public
Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn 1981). See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 294 (2008) (describing Lange’s essay as
“[t]he foundational essay” regarding “[t]he specific concern with the public domain”). The
values underlying the public domain, however, are intertwined both with the right of free speech
and the uncontroversial notion that creativity in general requires the use of others’ work as a
starting point. See id. at 122–24 (discussing the different ways in which works covered by patent
and copyright build on works already in existence).
24. The Framers’ understanding of “Science” was broader than the commonly accepted
modern meaning of the term: it encompassed all forms of knowledge acquired by study or
training, including, for example, philosophy and literature. See, e.g., 14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 648 (2d ed. 1989) (defining science as “[k]nowledge acquired by study;
acquaintance with or mastery of any department of learning,” with this usage current for several
centuries through 1781).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. This Note uses the term “monopoly-granting” as shorthand while acknowledging its
shortcomings as a description of what the IP Clause purports to do. The clause gives Congress
the power to grant authors and inventors exclusive economic rights over their creations—in
effect, making those authors and inventors monopolists over their “Writings and Discoveries.”
But unlike the traditional conception of the unregulated, unfettered commercial monopoly, the
copyright and patent monopolies granted pursuant to the IP Clause are limited in both duration
and scope, under the express terms of the clause itself.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. Professor Lawrence
Lessig is a proponent of this view:
[T]his clause is unique within the power-granting clause of Article I, section 8 of our
Constitution. Every other clause granting power to Congress simply says Congress
has the power to do something—for example, to regulate “commerce among the
several states” or “declare War.” But here, the “something” is something quite
specific—to “promote . . . Progress”—through means that are also specific—by
“securing” “exclusive Rights” (i.e., copyrights [and patents]) “for limited Times.”
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 215 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8). Indeed, it formed an integral part of his argument for the petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003). Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 10, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (No. 01618).
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Professor Lawrence Lessig, “Like every other power in Article I, sec.
8, ‘to promote the Progress of Science’ is the [grammatical] object of
‘Congress has the power . . . .’ Removing that object renders the
clause meaningless: ‘Congress has the power . . . by securing for
29
limited Times to Authors the exclusive Right to their Writings.’”
Had the Framers desired to grant a different power, the other
seventeen clauses in Article I, Section 8 are compelling evidence that
they could have done so. Nothing prevented them from wording the
clause to give Congress the power, for example, to secure for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and
inventions, in order to promote the progress of science and useful
arts. They might even have said simply that “Congress shall have the
30
power to grant patents and copyrights.” But that is not the language
the Framers chose.
If the progress-promoting clause is correctly viewed as the IP
Clause’s grant of power, the monopoly-granting clause should then be
viewed as the means by which Congress may exercise that grant of
31
power. The Framers and those of their generation reasoned that
32
monopolies are generally an evil. But in this one situation, properly
limited, they provide a desirable outcome that an unfettered market
in IP would otherwise fail to generate. Without legal protection,
authors and inventors, protective of their revenues, might be inclined
33
to seek nondisclosing solutions. The grant of a period of exclusivity
to authors and inventors promotes the release of their creations to the
public, increasing the general storehouse of knowledge.

29. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 10.
30. Jessica Talati, Comment, Copyrighting Stage Directions & the Constitutional Mandate
to “Promote the Progress of Science,” 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 241, 250 (2009).
31. See supra note 28.
32. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (“Jefferson, like other Americans,
had an instinctive aversion to monopolies. It was a monopoly on tea that sparked the
Revolution and Jefferson certainly did not favor an equivalent form of monopoly under the new
government.”).
33. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 23, at 251 (“[I]ntellectual property rights, like property
rights in general, have a role after the innovation has occurred—facilitating its efficient
exploitation, allowing inventors to disclose their inventions to prospective licensees without
thereby losing control of them, and providing a state-constructed, neatly tied bundle of
entitlements that can be efficiently traded in the market.”).
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If Congress’s IP power extends only as far as the boundaries of
the explicit grant in the IP Clause, and if the monopoly-granting
clause is to be read as the required means of implementing that
power, then that clause must also necessarily impose a limit on
34
Congress’s progress-promoting power.
Congress cannot, for
example, grant an author or inventor an exclusive right for an
35
unlimited time. An important goal of the IP clause is the eventual
release of works into the public domain, where they may serve as
building blocks for future creativity. An unlimited monopoly would
36
prevent works from reaching that goal.
Determining the exact shape of the limitation this reading
imposes on Congress’s progress-promoting power, however, requires
more than mere parsing. Here, there are two possible readings: first,
that the monopoly-granting clause as a whole limits the progresspromoting power, or, second, that the clause contains a cluster of
37
discrete limitations on the explicit means for exercising that power.

34. See John Deere, 383 U.S. at 5 (“The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.”).
But see infra note 37.
35. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“But the
requirement that [patent and copyright] grants be for ‘limited Times’ serves the ultimate
purpose of promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by guaranteeing that those
innovations will enter the public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires.” (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
36. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 23, at 11 (“[T]he goal of the system ought to be to give the
monopoly only for as long as necessary to provide an incentive. After that, we should let the
work fall into the public domain where all of us can use it, transform it, adapt it, build on it,
republish it as we wish.”).
37. Legal historian Edward Walterscheid advances a third possibility: that the monopolygranting clause is “an explanation of, rather than a limitation on” the progress-promoting
clause. Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 356. Although this reading purports to harmonize two
Supreme Court readings of the clause, its defect is that it appears to require reading an
additional word, “including,” into the constitutional text. Id. at 357 (arguing that the clause
should be interpreted to read, “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, [including] by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries” (alterations in original)).
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1. One View of the Monopoly-Granting Clause: Limiting in its
Entirety. One could view the monopoly-granting clause as a limit on
the progress-promoting clause as a whole: that is, Congress has the
power to promote progress, but may do so only by means of granting
38
limited monopolies to authors and inventors.
This reading is unsatisfactory. The primary and most convincing
of the reasons for this is that the promotion of the “Progress of
Science and useful Arts” is a policy the Framers presumably would
have wanted Congress to pursue even if by means other than those it
prescribed in this single clause, so long as those means were within
39
the scope of one of Congress’s other affirmative powers. The IP
Clause’s placement with Congress’s other affirmative powers in
Article I, Section 8 is an indication that the clause should be read to
40
increase those powers. The Constitution places limits on Congress’s
enumerated powers in Article I, Section 9. For example, although
Section 8 grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . .
41
among the several States,” its regulation cannot include taxation of
42
“Articles exported from any State.” Thus, a reading of the IP Clause
that places a significant limit on one of Congress’s other enumerated
powers in order to achieve the clause’s grant is inconsistent with its
placement in Article I, Section 8.

38. See id. at 355 (“[B]oth the Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit’s] own predecessor
court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals . . . had earlier used language suggesting that
promotion of the useful arts could in fact only occur through the patent and copyright
systems.”).
39. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”); Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 351 (“[A] wide
variety of other means than patents and copyrights were known for promoting the progress of
science and useful arts. Little in the contemporaneous record points to any reason why the
Framers would desire to preclude Congress from authority to use a wide variety of means to
promote the progress of science and useful arts.” (footnote omitted)); see also Walterscheid,
supra note 16, at 352 (“[W]hile congressional authority to spend public monies is not absolute
[under the General Welfare Clause], neither is it limited to the direct grants of legislative
authority found in the Constitution.”).
40. Cf. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419–20 (“The [‘necessary and proper’] clause is
placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers. . . . Its terms
purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government. It purports to be an
additional power, not a restriction on those already granted.”).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
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In other words, the limiting-as-a-whole reading would secure the
dark-gray area in Figure 1 by sacrificing the light-gray area; the better
reading, as discussed below, is that the IP Clause grants the dark-gray
area in addition to the light-gray area.
Figure 1. Reading the IP Clause

2. A Better View of the Monopoly-Granting Clause: A Cluster of
Discrete Limitations on the Exercise of the Enumerated Means.
Another possible view of the limit imposed by the monopoly-granting
clause is that it places a cluster of discrete limitations on the exercise
of the monopoly-granting means for exercising the progresspromoting power. In other words, if Congress wants to exercise its
progress-promoting power using the monopoly-granting means—if it
wishes to legislate in the dark-gray area in Figure 1—it must comply
43
with a series of limitations such as the following:
1. Congress may only secure copyright- and patent-style
44
rights over “Writings and Discoveries.”
2. Congress may only secure copyright- and patent-style
45
rights to “Authors and Inventors.”
43. This list is not meant to be exhaustive; other limitations are imposed by, for example,
the definition of “securing” and “exclusive Right.” See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”
(emphases added)).
44. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

MITCHELL IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

3/30/2011 12:01:21 PM

PROMOTING PROGRESS WITH FAIR USE

1649

3. The grant of exclusive rights on a particular writing or
discovery may go only to the author or inventor
46
responsible for its creation.
4. Congress may only grant these rights for “limited
47
Times.”
This reading gives effect to the IP Clause’s limitations while avoiding
the undesirable elimination of progress-promoting activities that fall
squarely within another of Congress’s enumerated powers. Further, it
hews more closely than does the earlier reading both to the plain
meaning of the text and to the clause’s placement with Congress’s
other affirmative powers in Article I, Section 8.
This second reading is not without problems, the primary one
being that distinguishing exercises of the monopoly-granting power
from exercises of other congressional powers is not always a simple
task. Making the distinction is necessary, however, because Congress
must determine whether it needs to comply with the restrictions in
the IP Clause or with those of some other clause. Trademark, for
example, is a monopoly grant of a type similar to those granted under
the IP Clause, but the Supreme Court rightly held that trademark law
is not a valid exercise of that clause because “it [does not] depend
upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It
requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It
48
is simply founded on priority of appropriation.” Further, the
purpose of trademark law is to avoid unfair competition, not to
promote progress. Federal trademark law is therefore an enactment
under the Commerce Clause rather than the IP Clause, and the
restrictions on Congress’s power to enact trademark law are those of
the Commerce Clause, not of the IP Clause.

45. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (securing “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries” (emphasis added)).
47. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). The Court went on to hold that the
trademark law as then enacted reached too far into intrastate commerce to be a valid exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Id. at 96–97. Congress therefore made certain to delineate
the limits of trademark protection in its subsequent trademark enactments. E.g., Act of Feb. 20,
1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, repealed by Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (allowing
registration of a trademark “used in commerce with foreign nations, or among the several
States, or with Indian tribes”).
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The universe of congressional enactments that lie on or near the
line between monopoly-granting enactments and enactments under
other congressional powers, however, is sufficiently small that any
uncertainty in this area is likely to be viewed as a reasonable tradeoff
as against other, more or less restrictive readings of the IP Clause.
49
Core IP rights like those granted by the current patent and copyright
50
are clearly “exclusive Right[s]” in “Writings and
statutes
Discoveries” being granted to “Authors and Inventors” for “limited
Times.” Only when Congress seeks to expand these rights do
51
problems arise.
B. Recent Interpretations of the IP Clause
Despite the text’s limitations, Congress has largely ignored the
52
limits of its IP Clause power. In part, this is because courts have,
either explicitly or implicitly, been reluctant to rein in Congress’s
more egregious excesses in this domain. This Section discusses the
courts’ responses first, then turns to Congress’s.
1. Courts. Although the courts traditionally interpreted the
progress-promoting clause as the grant of power in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8, the recent trend has been to give the progress-promoting
53
54
clause short shrift. This trend culminated in Eldred v. Ashcroft, in
which the Supreme Court dismissed the clause as “preambular
55
language.” At a minimum, the Eldred Court may be described as
receptive to the argument that the clause “places no substantive limit
56
on Congress’ legislative power,” at least in the context of copyright.
49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006).
50. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006).
51. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (reasoning that further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary because the Copyright Term Extension Act does not alter
the “traditional contours” of copyright (Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)).
52. See infra Part I.B.2.
53. See Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 332–33 (“The traditional view, which has been
voiced since the Constitution was ratified, is that the grant of power resides in the phrase ‘To
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . . . An entirely different interpretation began
to come into vogue in the second half of the twentieth century. According to this view, the ‘to
promote’ language is merely a preamble which sets forth only a statement of purpose.”
(footnote omitted)).
54. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
55. Id. at 211.
56. Id. at 197. Here, the Court is referring without demur to the petitioners’
“acknowledgment” regarding the “preamble.” Id. Whether the petitioners were
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In Eldred, seven Justices voted to uphold the constitutionality of the
58
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which
extended the term of existing copyrights by twenty years, from life-of59
the-author-plus-fifty-years to life-of-the-author-plus-seventy-years.
The Court’s analysis of the extent of Congress’s power under the IP
Clause focuses almost exclusively on the “limited Times” language of
the monopoly-granting clause, ignoring the issue of whether the
60
CTEA promotes progress.
Instead of reading the progress-promoting clause as a grant of
61
62
power, the Court read it as the “end” or the “objective” to which
Congress may legislate. This reading allowed the Court to avoid
closely considering whether the CTEA actually promotes progress
and instead to skip directly to a rational basis review of the CTEA,
focusing on the “limited Times” language of the IP Clause—a review
63
the Court performed with the usual extreme deference to Congress.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court concluded that the CTEA
was a “rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the
64
[IP] Clause” without once stating what that legislative authority
might be.
The Court concluded that, by enacting the CTEA, Congress had
65
66
effectuated “the ends of the Clause” and “the constitutional aim.”
“acknowledg[ing]” any such thing is not so cut-and-dried as the Court makes it sound, however.
See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 10–11 (arguing that the “grant of power”—
that is, the progress-promoting clause—has “[i]nterpretive [e]ffect”).
57. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222. Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 242 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, at least, appears to have had the
limitations imposed by the progress-promoting clause in mind. See id. at 223 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
58. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
59. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
60. Id. at 200–01.
61. Id. at 211.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 200 (“To comprehend the scope of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause,
‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’ History reveals an unbroken congressional
practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term
extensions . . . . Since then, Congress has regularly applied duration extensions to both existing
and future copyrights.” (citation omitted) (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921))). Justice Breyer argued forcefully in dissent that, even under this permissive standard,
the CTEA does not pass muster. Id. at 266–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 204–06 (majority opinion).
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
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Even assuming that this “ends” and “aim” language refers to the
67
progress-promoting clause, the Court here failed to accord that
clause its correct weight: the clause is not merely the “ends,” an
68
69
“aim,” or an “objective;” it is rather the grant of power itself.
Congress may come up short of its ends, miss its aim, or fail to secure
its objective. It may not exceed its power.
70
Echoes of Eldred can be found in District of Columbia v. Heller,
in which the Court described the “prefatory clause” of the Second
Amendment as merely “announc[ing] a purpose” for the
71
Amendment’s “operative clause.” The two situations, however, are
not analogous. The structure of the IP Clause is not like that of the
Second Amendment, which reads, “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
72
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Extraneous commas
notwithstanding, the Court’s reading of the Second Amendment is
convincing: a main clause (“the right of the people to keep and bear
arms[] shall not be infringed”) with a purposive, preambular
subordinate clause (“[a] well regulated militia[] being necessary to the
security of a free state”). The prevailing reading of the IP Clause, by
contrast, would turn what is grammatically the main clause into a
preamble and the subordinate clause into the operative one. Worse,
this judicial act of constitutional editing defies the often-announced
canon of construction that an unambiguous statement means what it
73
says on its face.
One commentator has viewed the Eldred Court’s treatment of
the progress-promoting clause as the latest, regrettable stage in what
is only a fairly recent evolution away from the plain meaning of the IP

67. See id. at 212 (“‘[T]he primary objective of copyright’ is ‘[t]o promote the Progress of
Science.’ The ‘constitutional command,’ we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it
enacts copyright laws at all, create a ‘system’ that ‘promote[s] the Progress of Science.’”
(citation omitted) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991))).
68. Id.
69. See supra Part I.A.
70. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
71. Id. at 2789; see also id. (“That requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory
clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause . . . . But apart from that clarifying
function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
73. E.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (“When we find the terms of a
statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in ‘rare and exceptional
circumstances.’” (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978))).
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Clause’s text. But it is not clear that the Court has, at least in recent
memory, applied the more stringent view of the IP Clause when
discussing copyright. The Supreme Court’s reading of the clause in
the context of patent, however, hews closer to the text. In the patent
75
case Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, the Court recognized
the progress-promoting clause as a hard limit on the exercise of
congressional power: “The [IP] clause is both a grant of power and a
limitation. This qualified authority . . . is limited to the promotion of
advances in the ‘useful arts.’ . . . The Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
76
constitutional purpose.” In treating the progress-promoting clause as
a restraint that Congress may not overreach, the Court more closely
77
approached the spirit of the IP Clause, if not its actual force. Six
years later, in the 1972 patent case Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
78
Corp., the Court stated simply that “[t]he direction of Art. I is that
Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and
79
the useful arts.” These statements are a far cry from the Eldred
Court’s avoidance of the subject two decades later.
It is unclear how much weight the Court gives to its patent
jurisprudence when considering copyright. But in Eldred, the Court
looked beyond its own recent patent-related holdings and focused on
congressional history: “[b]ecause the Clause empowering Congress to
confer copyrights also authorizes patents, congressional practice with
80
respect to patents informs our inquiry.” Although none of this is
conclusive, the case law suggests that Supreme Court jurisprudence
interpreting the IP Clause with regard to copyright is now on a
separate track from that interpreting the same clause with regard to
patent.
Lower courts have scarcely been any friendlier to a plainlanguage reading of the IP Clause. For example, before Eldred

74. See Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 332–33 (“An entirely different interpretation began
to come into vogue in the second half of the twentieth century. According to this view, the ‘to
promote’ language is merely a preamble which sets forth only a statement of purpose.”
(footnote omitted)).
75. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
76. Id. at 5–6.
77. For the argument that even this conception of Congress’s power is insufficient to meet
constitutional requirements, see infra Part II.
78. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
79. Id. at 530.
80. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 (2003).
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reached the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit ruled against the Eldred
81
petitioners in Eldred v. Reno and went even further than the
Supreme Court, affirmatively calling the progress-promoting clause a
82
“preambular statement of purpose[]” and drawing a distinction
83
between it and the “substantive grant of power.”
Courts at least have the excuse that they must in general look to
the arguments presented by the parties in the matters before them.
Congress faces no such limitations and boasts far-reaching factfinding
powers; yet its enactments lie at the root of the overreaching that
characterizes the current state of U.S. IP law.
2. Congress. In other areas, Congress has demonstrated that it
knows how to impose proper limits on its legislation. For example,
84
the language of the federal kidnapping statute, enacted in part
85
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, provides in relevant part that
[w]hoever unlawfully seizes . . . and holds for ransom or reward or
otherwise any person, . . . when . . . the person is willfully transported
in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . or the offender travels in
interstate or foreign commerce or uses . . . any means, facility, or
instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in
furtherance of the commission of the offense . . . shall be punished
86
by imprisonment for any term of years or for life . . . .

Congress here uses explicit and specific language to avoid legislating
beyond that clause’s bounds, using “interstate or foreign commerce”
as a limiting factor three distinct times in the course of a single
87
sentence.

81. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
82. Id. at 377.
83. Id. at 378 (“[A]lthough the plaintiffs claim that Feist supports using the preamble to
interpret the rest of the Clause, the Court in Feist never suggests that the preamble informs its
interpretation of the substantive grant of power to the Congress (which there turned upon the
meaning of ‘Authors’ and of ‘Writings,’ each standing alone).” (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47 (1991))). But see id. at 381 (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(“That clause empowers the Congress to do one thing, and one thing only. That one thing is ‘to
promote the progress of science and useful arts.’ . . . The clause is not an open grant of power to
secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power to promote progress.”).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (emphasis added).
87. Id.
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Similarly, the first Congress included limiting language in the
88
Copyright Act of 1790, which extended to “maps, charts, and books”
89
and was explicitly an “Act for the encouragement of learning.” But
90
Congress’s intent in passing the Copyright Act of 1976 appears much
different. Although Congress passed the Act pursuant to the IP
Clause, any limitations are seemingly absent. Instead, the law begins
with a statement that the limited copyright monopoly “subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
91
device.” This Act conspicuously lacks any requirement that the
92
“original work[] of authorship” “promote the Progress of Science
93
and useful Arts,” or even that the statute be interpreted with
Congress’s progress-promoting power in mind. Indeed, there is no
indication anywhere in the statute’s language that Congress has
considered itself limited by its stated grant of power.
3. A Principled View? If the trend has been to treat the IP
Clause simply as a monopoly-granting clause with some meaningless
surplusage tacked onto its front, surely those adhering to this
interpretation have reasons for doing so. One possible reason for the
courts’ behavior is that, by and large, they limit themselves to ruling
on the arguments presented to them, and even those attorneys who
advocate these or similar positions in their scholarship are reluctant
94
to do so in their briefs and arguments.
Congress’s motives—frequently influenced by industry
lobbying—have not always been faithful to the constitutional text.
The Congress that passed the CTEA, for example, seems to have
been motivated in no small part by a few members’ desire to extend
88. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
89. Id.
90. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006)).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
92. Id.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
94. See, e.g., Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 337 (describing Professor Lessig’s reluctance
to raise the argument that the progress-promoting clause places an “independent, substantive
limitation on the power of [C]ongress . . . . because it was unnecessary and seemed to open up
all sorts of new and unmanageable judicial review” (quoting private communication from
Lawrence Lessig to author (July 26, 2003))).
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copyright terms as far as possible without falling afoul of the “limited
95
Times” provision. Further, Congress has appeared susceptible to
lobbying pressure from industry groups like the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) and its music-industry counterpart,
96
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), which
push for increased—and not obviously progress-promoting—
protections, to the detriment of Congress’s constitutional
97
responsibilities.
II. INTERPRETING THE GRANT OF POWER: WHAT DOES IT MEAN
TO “[P]ROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS”?
Practices that fall outside the constitutional mandate to promote
progress are outside of Congress’s power. Without a clear method for
determining whether a given piece of legislation falls within that
mandate, however, it would be futile to demand that Congress or the
courts remain within the IP Clause’s bounds. This Part provides
a principled means for determining whether a given piece of
legislation “promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” a
determination that, though difficult, is not impossible.
A. What Does “[P]romote the Progress” Mean?
Because Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,” it is necessary to parse the words in the
grant to understand the nature and extent of the limitations those
words impose. “Science and useful Arts” are broad terms that
98
99
encompass all types of knowledge and invention; the limitations

95. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 256 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to the
statements of several members of Congress—including those of Representative Sonny Bono
and his widow, Representative Mary Bono Mack—that urge perpetual copyright terms).
96. The MPAA and RIAA regularly spend millions of dollars a year lobbying Congress.
Bruce Gain, Special Report: Music Industry’s Lavish Lobbying Campaign for Digital Rights,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 6, 2011, 4:38 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/01/06/
special-report-music-industrys-lavish-lobby-campaign-for-digital-rights; MPAA Spent $520K in
3Q Lobbying Federal Govt, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 16, 2010, 5:11 PM EST), http://finance.yahoo.
com/news/MPAA-spent-520K-in-3Q-apf-813283816.html.
97. See supra note 7.
98. See supra note 24.
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefore . . . .”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1979) (stating
that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun that is made by man” (quoting
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952))).
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imposed by the progress-promoting clause, therefore, must come, if at
all, from the definitions of “promote” and “Progress.” Based on the
definitions of those terms, the courts and Congress should determine
whether a given enactment promotes progress by answering the
following three questions:
1. Is it reasonable to believe that the law will encourage an
increase in the quality or quantity of knowledge?
2. Is it reasonable to believe that the law will encourage the
dissemination of knowledge?
3. Is it reasonable to believe that the encouragement this
law provides either to the increase of knowledge or to the
dissemination of knowledge will be an improvement over
the encouragement provided by existing laws?
1. “Progress.” Several definitions of “Progress” have emerged
over the past decade. One view sees progress in terms of qualitative
advancement: the progress of knowledge is promoted by those works
100
and activities that increase knowledge both in kind and in amount.
A second view, which its adherents claim hews closer to the Framers’
understanding of the term, conceives of progress as a physical motion,
which, in the context of IP, connotes the dissemination or spread of
101
knowledge.
Though based on solid historical and linguistic
102
evidence, this interpretation is strained because it excludes much of
what both our generation considers and the Framers’ considered to
103
be part of “Progress.” Each of these first two views is an attempt to
provide a principled limit to the discretion vested in Congress under
the IP Clause by limiting the purposes to which Congress may apply
104
its progress-promoting power.
100. E.g., Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 374 (“[Progress] meant . . . the idea of
advancement in science and the useful arts, including through the efforts of writers and
inventors in creating new writings and finding out new discoveries of a utilitarian
nature. . . . [T]he Clause was intended to provide an incentive for advances in science and the
useful arts through encouragement of the intellectual efforts of writers and inventors.”).
101. E.g., Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause,
80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755 (2001).
102. Id. at 799–809.
103. Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 374 (“[O]ne of the dictionary definitions of ‘progress’ at
the end of the eighteenth century was ‘intellectual improvement; intellectual
advancement’ . . . .”).
104. See infra Part II.A.2.
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A third position combines the previous two, asserting that
“Progress” may be either qualitative advancement or dissemination
105
of knowledge. Additionally, the commentators advancing this
reading include the preservation of existing works within the concept
106
of dissemination.
Unlike the previous two definitions, this
disjunctive test does little work; indeed, under it, “it is unclear in what
manner the ‘to promote’ language actually constrains the copyright
107
power of Congress.”
The inclusion of “encouraging the . . .
108
preservation of existing works” as an independently sufficient
condition for a finding that Congress is “promot[ing] the Progress”
provides few constraints on congressional action. If it limits Congress
at all, in fact, it does so only by forbidding Congress from actively
109
seeking the destruction of existing works in its copyright laws.
A better reading is that “Progress” requires both qualitative
110
advancement and dissemination. A work that advances knowledge
in some field but is not disseminated cannot be said to have promoted
105. Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2002).
106. See id. at 3 n.10 (advancing the argument that “[copyright-term] extension ‘give[s]
copyright holders an incentive to preserve older works, particularly motion pictures in need of
restoration’” and is therefore “‘plainly adapted’ and ‘appropriate’ to ‘promot[ing] progress’”
(quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378–79 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
107. Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 377.
108. Hatch & Lee, supra note 105, at 23.
109. As absurd as the idea sounds that Congress might intentionally choose to destroy
existing works, there is evidence that the CTEA has done exactly that. Before enacting the
CTEA, Congress heard from film historians that the Act would hinder or prevent the efforts of
film preservationists to save films that are stored on old film stock. E.g., Letter from Larry
Urbanski, Chairman, Am. Film Heritage Ass’n, to Sen. Strom Thurmond (Mar. 31, 1997),
available at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/letters/AFH.
html.
110. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment seek related objectives—the creation and
dissemination of information.” (emphasis added)); Malla Pollack, Dealing with Old Father
William, or Moving from Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review
of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (2002) (“[T]he creation
and dissemination” of “knowledge (‘Science’), technology (‘useful Arts’), writings, and
discoveries” are “necessary to the continued viability of a republican polity.”); Walterscheid,
supra note 16, at 376 (suggesting that Pollack’s language, possibly indicating a shift toward
including “both creation and dissemination,” leaves them “in basic agreement as to the
interpretation to be given to ‘Progress.’”). But see Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 374 (“I
suggest that it meant, and was intended to mean, the idea of advancement in science and the
useful arts, including through the efforts of writers and inventors in creating new writings and
finding out new discoveries of a utilitarian nature. That is to say, the Clause was intended to
provide an incentive for advances in science and the useful arts through encouragement of the
intellectual efforts of writers and inventors.”).
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Similarly, a work that is
progress in any meaningful sense.
disseminated among the masses but that does not expand the
boundaries of knowledge is not progress promoting.
Therefore, Congress and the courts should begin by asking, first,
whether it is reasonable to believe that a copyright enactment under
consideration will encourage an increase in the quality or quantity of
knowledge, and, second, whether it is reasonable to believe that the
law will encourage the dissemination of that knowledge. To find that
the law promotes progress, the questioner must answer both
112
questions in the affirmative.
2. “Promote.” Although a great deal more scholarly attention
113
focuses on what “Progress” means, the Supreme Court has weighed
in instead on how to define “promote,” stating that it means “to
114
stimulate, to encourage, or to induce.”
But “promote”—like
“Progress”—also includes connotations of forward motion or
115
advancement.
It is consistent with both readings to require that, when Congress
legislates pursuant to the IP Clause, its legislation must offer some

111. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 497 (1850) (“If the foreign invention had
been printed or patented, it was already given to the world and open to the people of this
country, as well as of others, upon reasonable inquiry. They would therefore derive no
advantage from the invention here. It would confer no benefit upon the community, and the
inventor therefore is not considered to be entitled to the reward. But if the foreign discovery is
not patented, nor described in any printed publication, it might be known and used in remote
places for ages, and the people of this country be unable to profit by it. The means of obtaining
knowledge would not be within their reach; and, as far as their interest is concerned, it would be
the same thing as if the improvement had never been discovered.”).
112. In this analysis, it is important to separate the law from the work it protects. A law may
promote progress without requiring that the works it protects push back the boundaries of
knowledge. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a law that encourages experimentation—and thus
promotes progress—without offering protection to a wide variety of works. First, the work’s
author may not be the best judge of the work’s progress-promoting qualities, and, second, those
qualities may not become apparent until later in the work’s life cycle. See, e.g., Alan Friedman,
A Sad and Funny Story, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1980, § 7 (book review), at 2 (describing the
tortured publication history of John Kennedy Toole’s posthumously published novel A
Confederacy of Dunces).
113. See supra Part II.A.1.
114. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 616. It is also perhaps
notable that the Framers chose the “to promote” language over language that specifically
included the term “encourage.” Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 341 (“Madison’s notes indicate
that among those submitted by him [was] . . . ‘To encourage by premiums & provisions, the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.’”).
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modicum of improvement of the incentives to progress over those
provided by current legislation.
A piece of legislation that reduces incentives to progress cannot,
de facto, be called a promotion of progress. More subtly, a piece of
legislation that merely keeps to existing levels of encouragement
cannot be said to “promote . . . Progress” either, but rather merely to
continue or maintain it. Put differently, an incentive—a device “to
stimulate, to encourage, or to induce”—provides a spur where none
existed before or where the existing one was insufficient to generate
the desired behavior.
Thus, the third question that the courts and Congress should ask
about any given piece of IP legislation is whether it is reasonable to
believe that the encouragement the law will provide either to the
increase or the dissemination of knowledge will be an improvement
over the encouragement provided by existing laws.
These three questions provide Congress and the courts with a
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of IP enactments under
the IP Clause. The next Part suggests how the framework might be
put into use.
III. LIMITING THE DAMAGE: A JUDICIAL SOLUTION?
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problems outlined in
this Note. Righting the direction of IP policy in the United States will
require concerted efforts by both the legislature and the judiciary.
That cooperation is, concededly, unlikely. Still, either branch acting
alone could make significant inroads against overreaching IP
enactments, as this Part will show.
Congress has a wide variety of potential solutions at its fingertips
should it decide to comply with the constitutional mandate that it
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” in its IP
116
enactments. One relatively simple solution would be to amend the
Copyright and Patent Acts with a mandate that courts limit their

116. E.g., Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of 2007 (FAIR
USE), H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing to strengthen fair use and restore commonsense consumer rights to make use of copies of the copyrighted works that they have
purchased); Benefit Authors Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2005, H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. (2005) (same).
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enforcement of those acts to cases that promote progress. Another,
more adventurous—and therefore less likely—solution would be to
embed sunset provisions in new copyright legislation, describing
Congress’s belief that the legislation will promote progress but
invalidating the law if certain empirical targets—for example,
measuring the growth of research or writings in specified areas of
118
scholarship or literature—are not met.
The courts, for their part, should respond to laws that overreach
Congress’s power with two measures. First, they should reject any
further expansions of copyright law that cannot be shown to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Second, they
should limit the application of current copyright laws by reading in a
requirement that any application of a copyright or patent statute
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” An ideal solution
would involve findings of as-applied or even facial unconstitutionality
for some of the most recent copyright-related enactments. Such
holdings, however, would buck precedent—including Eldred—and
therefore lower courts’ hands are effectively tied.
A. A Fifth Fair-Use Factor: Balancing Progress-Promoting Values
This is not to say, however, that courts’ quivers are empty when
they see parties urging applications of copyright or copyright-related
laws that are progress-retarding or progress-neutral. Courts may rule
that an alleged infringer whose use is more progress-promoting than
the allegedly infringed copyright is instead making a fair use of the
copyrighted material.
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act states that “the fair use of
119
a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” Hence,
a person making a fair use of a copyright holder’s work is not liable to
120
that copyright holder. Section 107 does not offer a definition of fair
use; instead, it provides two sets of tools to guide the court in its
analysis of whether an otherwise infringing use should be considered
117. Compare supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text, describing the internal limitations
placed on the federal kidnapping statute by Congress in an attempt to remain within its
Commerce Clause power.
118. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006) (providing that the Librarian of Congress may
grant three-year exemptions from the strictures of the anticircumvention provisions of the
DMCA to certain classes of copyrighted works, subject to a five-factor determination including
several empirical or quasi-empirical findings).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
120. See id.
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121

noninfringing. The first tool is a nonexclusive list of “purposes” to
which a fair use might be put: “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
122
research.” This list does little work beyond putting courts on notice
123
concerning the kinds of uses that might be (but sometimes are not )
fair.
124
The second tool is a nonexclusive list of four factors that courts
125
must consider “in determining whether the use . . . is a fair use”:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of
126
all the above factors.

The fair-use doctrine has aptly been described as “the duct tape
127
of the copyright system,” in part because it offers courts a remedy
for situations in which the literal application of a copyright law would
128
lead to an absurd or undesirable result. Pressing fair use into service
121. Id. (suggesting that certain uses are noninfringing when they are “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship or research”).
122. Id.
123. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that § 107 “does not provide blanket immunity for ‘multiple copies for classroom
use’”).
124. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (stating that
“[t]he factors enumerated in the section are not meant to be exclusive” but are “especially
relevant”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he factors to be considered shall include [the four
factors].”).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
126. Id. § 107(1)–(4).
127. BOYLE, supra note 23, at 120.
128. E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451–55 (1983)
(holding that unauthorized time-shifting of copyrighted telecasts using a videocassette
recorder—though it is technically a violation of a copyright owner’s § 106 rights—is a fair use,
because it is noncommercial and causes little or no harm). Whenever a scholar, critic, or student
quotes another work, he would—but for the fair use defense—risk copyright liability, because
quotation is a “reproduc[tion of] the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Fair use also
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to ensure that copyright promotes progress is not a new idea;
indeed, as the Supreme Court held in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
130
Inc., the doctrine’s goal is to “fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o
131
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” Courts are
admonished to “avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when,
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
132
designed to foster.” Instead, courts must weigh the enumerated
133
factors “in light of the purposes of copyright.” Neither Acuff-Rose
nor previous scholarship in this direction, however, has provided the
134
courts with sufficient guidance in balancing the relevant concerns.
Judges should therefore apply a fifth fair-use factor, making
explicit the weighing of the progress-promoting clause with respect to
the work of each of the parties. Thus, in addition to the other four
factors, courts should consider the effect of the alleged infringer’s use
on the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts, and
whether that use better serves the progress-promoting purpose than
does enforcement of the copyright holder’s rights over the
copyrighted work. To determine the relative levels of progress
promotion, courts should look at each use with the three questions
from Part II.A in mind.
In conducting this analysis, courts should balance the use of the
work against the progress-promoting value of enforcing the copyright
holder’s rights, rather than simply looking at the progress-promoting
value—if any—of the work itself. Two uses of the same work might
have different progress-promoting values. For example, verbatim
copying for one’s own personal use is less likely to promote progress
generally protects the professor who hands out in-class photocopies for her students. Id. § 107
(“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies . . . for . . . teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) . . . is not an
infringement of copyright.”). But see Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1393 (rejecting
defendants’ fair use defense of the creation of “coursepacks,” which contained photocopies of
professor-selected readings for use by those professors’ students).
129. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1839–40
(2006) (“In certain cases it would be desirable, and indeed natural, to ask whether the examined
use promotes the progress of knowledge or not.”).
130. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
131. Id. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
132. Id. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
133. Id. at 578.
134. See Oliar, supra note 129, at 1839–40 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit could have
“recognize[d] the constitutional purpose of the copyright system as a fifth relevant fair use
factor” in deciding Kelly v. Arriba, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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than is the creation of a derivative work. In making that assessment,
courts need not determine whether the work being copied makes a
significant advancement of human knowledge.
There are two situations in which a court could find that this fifth
fair-use factor favors the alleged infringer. In the first situation,
enforcement of the copyright holder’s rights is progress retarding or
progress neutral, and the alleged infringer’s use is progress
135
promoting. In such a situation, this proposed new factor should be
tied to a strong presumption that the alleged infringer’s use is fair, a
presumption rebuttable only by a finding that all four of the other
factors weigh against fair use. The addition of a presumption to the
fair-use weighing test is within the bounds of accepted fair-use
analysis: in 1983, the Supreme Court effectively added a presumption
to the first fair-use factor with its statement that “every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of
136
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.”
Moreover, if Congress’s power extends only to progress-promoting
enactments, the addition of this presumption to the fair-use-factor
analysis would help ensure that the application of copyright law hews
to constitutional limitations, even if the law itself does not.
The second situation in which a court might find that the new
factor favors the alleged infringer is when the copyright holder’s use
is progress promoting, but the alleged infringer’s use is clearly more
137
so. Because the underlying copyright is progress promoting—thus
satisfying the constitutional requirements for copyright and therefore
making the use a fit subject for congressional legislation—the
proposed new factor should be treated as equal in weight to the other
four, with no presumption tied to it. This reduction in significance
balances the consideration that the progress-promoting clause
contains no requirement that Congress promote progress by the best
means available against the consideration that a court should accord
some weight to a use’s more efficient or effective promotion of
progress.
Although finding fair use where the alleged infringer’s use
promotes progress to a greater extent than the enforcement of the
copyright holder’s copyright is perhaps the most helpful of an unlikely
range of judicial solutions, it is by no means a perfect one. One major
135. See infra Part III.C.
136. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1983).
137. See infra Part III.C.
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difficulty from the perspective of an alleged infringer hoping to rely
on fair use—and especially on an expanded conception of fair use—is
that, procedurally, fair use is often raised at trial as the only viable
138
defense to what is otherwise clear infringement. Thus, the alleged
infringer labors under the threat of litigation, and uncertainty about
her rights as against those of the copyright holder may cause her to
avoid making use of the work at all—even if her intended use would,
in all probability, be ruled a fair one.
Another challenge is that the question of what promotes
139
progress is by its nature a difficult determination. Indeed, this is
likely one reason why the courts have hitherto been squeamish about
enforcing the progress-promoting clause as a substantive limitation on
Congress’s power. This Note has argued that there is a principled
means for making that determination; however, the burden of doing
so might more fairly be placed on an appellate court reviewing the
constitutionality of a piece of legislation than on a trial court
adjudicating a dispute over whether a given use is fair. A third, and
related, problem is the potential increase in both the frequency and
difficulty of litigation, further straining the courts’ already-strained
dockets and budgets.
One response to these last two difficulties is that the explicit
review of progress promotion is only a short step from the analysis
that courts are supposed to perform in every fair-use determination
under current precedent. Courts are to explore all four of the
statutory factors and “weigh[ them] together[] in light of the purposes
140
of copyright.” If the Acuff-Rose Court intended for that directive to
have some substantive effect, then the fair-use reviewing court must
already consider to some extent the progress-promoting values of
both the allegedly infringing use and the underlying copyright.
B. Promoting Progress in the Aggregate
Applying this fifth fair-use factor would allow attorneys
representing alleged infringers to argue that, in the aggregate,
individual acts of what would otherwise be copyright infringement

138. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 574 (“It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew’s song
would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose’s rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ under the Copyright
Act of 1976, but for a finding of fair use through parody.” (citation omitted)).
139. See supra Part II.
140. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578.
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can promote progress better than can the enforcement, against all
alleged infringers, of the underlying copyright.
141
In the 1942 Commerce Clause case Wickard v. Filburn, the
Supreme Court held that Congress could legislate in a manner that
reached individual farmers’ use of their own wheat, despite its purely
142
intrastate nature. Key to this determination was the finding that
although “appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may
be trivial by itself[, that] is not enough to remove him from the scope
of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together
143
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”
Just as individual, intrastate acts can have a judicially and
congressionally cognizable negative effect on interstate commerce,
individual acts of alleged copyright infringement can have a judicially
144
cognizable positive effect on progress. The collective action of, for
example, a million individuals adopting a disruptive new technology
(be it the VCR or peer-to-peer file-sharing software) places pressure
145
on the industries involved to adapt and innovate —the kind of
“Progress” the Framers thought Congress should promote. In such
situations, and especially when faced with an enactment that has been
shown to be contrary to innovation in some of its applications, a judge
reviewing the individual adopter’s case should consider a finding of
fair use.
One objection to this proposal is that it costs copyright holders
profits. For example, the RIAA has alleged billions of dollars in

141. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
142. Id. at 125 (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what
might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”).
143. Id. at 127–28; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“When Congress
decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to the national market, it may
regulate the entire class.” (citation omitted)).
144. This argument, although similar to that in Wickard, is perhaps better viewed as its
mirror image. In Wickard, the individual’s activity, when considered in a collective context,
placed him within the bounds of Congress’s affirmative constitutional reach. Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 127–28. Here, by contrast, the individual’s activity, when considered in a collective context,
may place him outside the enforceable bounds of a congressional enactment.
145. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 4 (“History has proved repeatedly that there is no genuine
choice when businesses are faced with a new product that gives consumers what they want.
Failure to adapt is fatal even to well-managed market leaders that stay in close touch with their
customers.”).
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146

losses due to peer-to-peer file sharing. The courts must remember
that activities that limit profits may retard progress, but the one does
not imply the other. The RIAA’s losses, even if proved, are not
directly relevant to the question of progress promotion. Peer-to-peer
file sharing has promoted progress both by directly increasing the
147
dissemination of knowledge and by advancing the technical means
by which knowledge can be disseminated through the impetus to
create ever more efficient and decentralized networks. The loss of
recording-industry profits would be relevant to the question of
progress promotion only insofar as that loss has generated a decline
in the amount or quality of music being produced. So long as the
income still being generated is sufficient to create incentives for new
work, the constitutional requirement of progress promotion is
satisfied.
C. Effects of Expanding Fair Use
Addition of this fifth fair-use factor would have a destabilizing
effect on many existing copyrights. But because the fair-use analysis is
dependent on individualized determinations, the effect will
necessarily be restricted to those situations in which courts find uses
to be fair.
One area in which the proposed fifth factor would make a
significant difference is in the use of orphan works. An orphan work
is a work that is presumptively under copyright, but for which no
148
copyright holder is known or can be located. The problem of
orphan works results from a combination of automatic copyright
protection with ever-lengthening copyright terms that extend well
149
beyond an author’s lifespan. Under previous incarnations of the
Copyright Act, many of these works would be in the public domain,
either because their terms had expired or because the original author
did not register the copyright and therefore did not receive copyright

146. Piracy: On-line and On the Street, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last
visited Mar. 3, 2011).
147. See supra text accompanying note 110.
148. Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) (defining “orphan works” as
“copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or even impossible to locate”).
149. See id. at 3740 (“The legislative history to the 1976 [Copyright] Act reflects Congress’
recognition of the concern raised by some that eliminating renewal requirements would take a
large number of works out of the public domain and that for a number of those older works it
might be difficult or impossible to identify the copyright owner in order to obtain
permissions.”).
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protection. Under the 1978 Act—which grants automatic protection
upon the work’s fixation and which, as amended, now protects the
work for the life of the author plus seventy years—it is likely that a
work created in the second half of the twentieth century will not enter
150
the public domain until the end of the twenty-first. Orphan works—
those that have fallen through the cracks—cannot legally be
reproduced, because to do so without authorization is a violation of
151
the author’s rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act. And because
the works are orphaned, no author can be petitioned for a license or
other permission to reproduce the work. These works represent a rich
vein of culture that might provide education and entertainment to a
new audience, or that artists and authors could mine for use in their
own derivative works.
Any use of an otherwise-unused orphan work—either its direct
reproduction for distribution or its use in a derivative work—is likely
to promote both the advancement and the spread of knowledge to a
significantly greater degree than the protection of an unknown
author’s right to prevent reproduction. Indeed, orphan works
languish in archives and on bookshelves, often stored in deteriorating
152
media.
Imagine that a publishing house comes into possession of an
anonymous, unpublished novel of great cultural significance, written
at some point in the 1960s. The publishing house could publish the
book, gambling that the original owner is unlikely to step forward at
153
this late date. But, under the law as it currently exists, if the author

150. A work created in 1960 by an author who was twenty-five at the time and who dies at
age eighty (in 2015) will not enter the public domain until 2085—assuming no further extensions
of the copyright term. Given the recent history of congressional practice in this area, that is
probably not a safe assumption to make.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive right[] . . . to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . .”).
152. E.g., Pamela Brannon, Note, Reforming Copyright to Foster Innovation: Providing
Access to Orphaned Works, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 146 (2006) (describing the problems
faced by the owner of a collection of copyrighted Apple II software, which is stored on magnetic
media that have become unreadable).
153. This is, in fact, quite similar to the task undertaken by the Google Books project,
Google’s attempt to digitize all printed material and render it searchable. The Authors’ Guild
sued Google. Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 2005), available at http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-resources.
attachment/authors-guild-v-google/Authors Guild v Google 09202005.pdf. After several years of
legal wrangling, Google and the Authors’ Guild, along with the Association of American
Publishers, announced a settlement under which Google would pay $125 million in exchange for
certain use licenses, including those regarding orphan works. Stephanie Condon, Google
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did then step forward, the publisher could be on the hook for millions
of dollars in statutory damages—a calculus no corporate attorney is
likely to approve. Under current law, the use made by the publisher
would almost certainly not be considered fair because the first three
154
fair-use factors weigh heavily against a finding of fair use.
In this situation, however, a reviewing court would almost
certainly find that the proposed fifth factor weighs in favor of a
finding of fair use, because enforcement of the copyright holder’s
155
copyright—as against the publisher —would likely be progressretarding, or at best progress-neutral. This finding would raise a
presumption that the use was fair. And under this Note’s proposed
framework, even a finding that the first three factors hewed against
finding the use fair would still be insufficient to overcome the fair-use
presumption, because the fourth factor—“the effect of the use upon
156
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” —would,
at worst, be a wash, and would more likely fall in favor of a finding of
fair use. Almost by definition, there is no market for an orphan work,
because without the authorization of the absent author, the work
cannot be reproduced for sale. The actions of the publisher thus do
not harm the market for the work; rather, they create the market.
This leads to another useful effect of the proposed fifth factor.
The fourth factor often leads to circular reasoning, because to assess
the effect of an alleged infringer’s use on the market for a copyrighted
work, a court must assume a market for licenses for the alleged
infringer’s use. Such a market will exist only if a court does not find
157
that the use was fair. Because the fourth factor is often dispositive,
Reaches $125 Million Settlement with Authors, CNET (Oct. 28, 2008, 7:49 AM PDT), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10076948-38.html. Under this Note’s proposed framework,
digitizing orphan works and making them available to the public would be a presumptively fair
use.
154. The use would be commercial, the work—a novel—would be one that traditionally
receives “thick” copyright protection, and the novel’s publication would of necessity require the
use of all of the original work.
155. Once the book has seen publication and a previously unknown author has stepped
forward to challenge the publisher’s use of his work, the scales would likely tip back in favor of
enforcing the author’s rights to the work. Compensating the author for further editions of his
work—beyond the publisher’s first publication—would provide an incentive for the author to
create further works. Note that the effect of this incentive is lessened considerably if it is not the
author but his heir who steps forward to claim the windfall.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
157. Because a fair use is not an infringement, an author has no legally protectable interest
in preventing it and therefore cannot reasonably expect to charge money for that use. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (noting, in a fair use case, that “the
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allowing its determination to turn on circular, self-fulfilling reasoning
158
guts the fair-use doctrine. The new progress-weighing factor would
restore balance by providing the courts with objective guidance: the
question of whether a use promotes the advancement and
dissemination of knowledge is one that is susceptible of empirical
159
proof.
This expansion of the fair-use doctrine through judges’ inclusion
of a fifth fair-use factor weighing progress-promoting values would
help place copyright law back on course. Although its effects would
destabilize some copyright holders’ rights in their copyrighted works,
that destabilization would extend primarily to situations in which the
copyright holder’s use was ineffective in advancing or disseminating
160
knowledge. And in those cases, it seems unobjectionable for the
courts to assist Congress in ensuring that its laws do not flout the
161
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
One may hope that copyright’s swallowing of the public domain
cannot get much worse—that IP protections are approaching a nadir
beyond which policymakers will realize the folly of their ways and
start steering the ship of American copyright policy away from the
shark-infested shoals of ever-increasing IP protection. When we find

unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their
own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market”).
158. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 620 (2008) (“Ultimately, the paradox of the fourth factor is that it
is everything in the fair use test and thus nothing.”).
159. See generally Comm’n of the European Communities, First Evaluation of Directive
96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases (Dec. 12, 2005) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.
pdf (providing empirical evidence that the European Union’s adoption of a sui generis database
protection right, akin to copyright, had a negative effect on the growth of Europe’s database
industry). For related discussion, see supra Part II.A.
160. To the extent that the destabilization would extend beyond these holders’ uses, it
would create pressure on all copyright holders to ensure that the uses being made of their works
promote progress. To the extent that authors maintain ownership of their copyrights, this,
concededly, might have the effect of channeling authorial resources away from the creation of
new works. But in a regime in which authorship is often divorced from copyright ownership, it
seems likely that the general progress-promoting pressure would outweigh any tangential
progress-retarding effects.
161. See U.S. CONST. art VI (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned . . . and
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”).
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ourselves in a world in which IP laws increasingly serve not to
promote progress but rather to retard it, policymakers’ response must
not be to rely on the vain hope that steering the present course—
increasing the strength, reach, and duration of those laws—will solve
the problem.
This Note is an attempt to provide one more navigational aid in
the ever-growing panoply of scholarly opinion concerning copyright’s
excesses. Courts considering copyright-infringement cases could place
substantive limits on copyright holders’ monopolies on their works by
finding fair use when it appears that others’ use of those works better
effectuates the constitutional mandate of the IP Clause.
It may not yet be too late to avoid a world in which advances in
knowledge, literature, and art can come only after an investment of
time and resources in discovering and licensing prior copyrighted
work. We could instead return to a world with a rich, vibrant, and—
most importantly—growing public domain upon which authors and
artists can draw to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
162
Arts.”

162. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

